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NATURAL LAW IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE

N

ATURAL LAW has been defined as "the rule of conduct
which is prescribed to us by the Creator in the constitution of the nature with which He has endowed us." 1 This
definition points to the source of the law; it purports to tell
not only what the law is objectively in itself, but also where
it comes from, namely, the Creator. According to another
definition, it is "a rule of action mandatory in form, which
reason itself reveals as established and promulgated by the
Author of nature and imposed upon all men." 2 This definition
is subject to the same criticism as the other: It includes a reference to the source of the law; in addition it includes a refence to the manner in which it is revealed to us. Now in considering objectively what a thing is in itself, it may be of the
utmost importance to know where it came from and the manner in which it is revealed to us. But it would be helpful to
clear thinking if these matters were discussed separately and
excluded from the definition. If then we take these two definitions as correct statements and eliminate from them the references to the source of the law and the manner of its revela1 9 CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 76.
2 Fzpucis P. LEBuPPE, S. J., OutmnS or PuRE JURISPRUDENCE 33.
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tion, we may perhaps express the same idea by defining the
natural law as the rule of conduct which man must observe in
order to act in accordance with his nature. It easily follows
from this that wherever we find human nature, we find the
natural law. "The discriminating norm," says Professor Fox,
"is human nature itself objectively considered. It is the book

in which is written the text of the law and the classification
of human actions into good and bad." I Reading in this text
book, we find that there are certain things, such as murder,
robbery, theft, lying, which are everywhere regarded as
wrong, irrespective of any positive enactment. They violate
the concept of justice which, as between man and man, requires us to give to everyone what is due to him, i. e., what is
rightfully his. "Justitia est virtus suum cuique tribuens.",
From very ancient times until quite recently, this broad
principle of right and wrong was everywhere recognized as
the presupposition and foundation of every legal system.
Sophocles, in his drama Oedipus Rex, tells us of "laws that in
the highest heaven had their birth; they were not made by
the race of mortal men, nor shall oblivion ever put them to
sleep, for the power of God is mighty in them and groweth
not old." So also Cicero, in his oration Pro Milone, speaks of
a law which was never written, which was never taught, and
which we never learned by reading, but which was drawn
from nature herself; in which we have never been instructed,
but for which we were made; which was never created by
man's institution, but with which we are all imbued. Much
to the same effect is the dictum of Blackstone, who, writing
in 1765, began his commentaries as follows:
"Man, considered as a creature, must necessarily be subject to the
laws of his Creator. This will of his Maker is called the Law of Nature.
This Law of Nature, being coeval with mankind and dedicated by God

Himself, is, of course, superior in obligation to any other. It is binding
over all the globe, in all countries, and at all times; no human laws are

a

9 CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 77.

4

vI'ToR CATEREIN, S. J., RECHT, NATURRECET

MICH. L. REv. 306.

ND Posrnws RECHT 51; 16
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of any validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid derive
all their force and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from
this original."

Coming from the ancient Greeks and Romans, scientifically elaborated and referred to its true source by the philosophers of the Middle Ages, adopted and consistently maintained by the great lawyers of early England, this notion of a
higher law antecedent and superior to all human legislation
found its way into American jurisprudence and has played a
very important part in the development of our law. It is true
that the influence of the natural law today is not so apparent
as it was in the earlier days when the foundations of our law
were being laid. Professor M. Taylor, writing in 1891 and
referring to the "time honored doctrine of natural right or
natural law," says:
"When one reminds himself that for nearly twenty-two centuries
this doctrine had practically universal acceptance, that it was the
creed of Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Marcus Aurelius, Gaius, Augustine,
Aquinas, Grotius, Locke, and Kant, its present forlorn state is somewhat noteworthy." 5

I am con'enced, however, that as far as the actual practice
of American courts is concerned, this disregard of the natural
law is more apparent than real. It is the purpose of the present article to consider its influence in American judicial decisions in order to determine whether within that field the natural law is really so "forlorn" as Professor Taylor's comment
indicates.
In determining the place of the natural law in the American legal system, three situations must be carefully distinguished: cases in which there is no applicable statute; cases
in which the applicable is in conflict with the constitution;
and cases in which the applicable statute is consistent with
the constitution but in conflict with the natural law. Let us
consider these three cases in the order named.
Where there is no applicable statute, the case must be decided according to the common law. But where, in any case
5

TAYLo, TnE LAw or NAr 1E 1.
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of first impression, can the court find the common law? The
sole basis of the decision in such a case is a broad and indefinite concept of justice. It is the court's sense of what is just
and reasonable under the circumstances. The proposition of
law for which the case stands is merely a rule which, to the
mind of the judge, seems fair and right.6 Since judges are
fallible, it may of course happen in some instances that the
particular proposition of law laid down as the basis of the
decision may not be a logical conclusion from the natural law
or a sound application of its principle, but even in these instances the natural law furnishes the only possible explanation of how the rule of the case comes to be regarded as a
rule of law, i. e., a rule with as much binding force as any
positive enactment. Only in this way can we satisfactorily
explain how the concepts of reasonable price and reasonable
time have become the most familiar elements of our contract
law. And take, for instance, the law of quasi-contracts. Is
there any single rule in the whole field of the substantive law
on this subject which is anything else than an expression of
the natural law? Or take the doctrine of unjust enrichment
with all its ramifications. Is it anything else than a multifarious application of the principle of suum cuique? And what is
it but the simple requirement of commutative justice which
the American Law Institute has put into Section 90 of its
Restatement? Is there indeed any contractual obligation
which is not traceable to the requirement of the natural law
expressed in that simple Latin maxim, pacta sunt servanda?
In the field of torts, the test of what a reasonable man would
do under the circumstances governs our modern law of negligence. And where did the courts get this test? From no
other source than the natural law. In the field of equity, the
courts, by applying the broad principles of justice, have not
laid down in any positive enactment, but have developed the
doctrine of estoppel in pals into, the "most powerful and flexible instrument to be found in any system of civil jurispru6

Wicker v. Jones, 159 N. C. 102, 74 S. E. 801 (1912).
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dence." I In the field of property law, there is the striking
statement of Justice Farwell, who, in determining the rights
of riparian owners, said:
"I have come to the conclusion that jus naturae is used in these
cases as expressing that principle in English law which is akin to, if
not derived from, the jus naturale of the Roman law. English law is,
of course, quite independent of the Roman law, but the conception of
aequum et bonum and the rights flowing therefrom which are included
in jus naturale underlie a great part of the English common law; although it is not usual to find the natural law referred in so many
words in English cases.... I am therefore not introducing any novel

principle if I regard jus naturae, on which the right to running water
rests, as meaning that which is aequum et bonum between upper and
lower proprietors." 8

It is to be observed that according to the whole theory of
the common law, the court in these cases of first impression
does not exercise a "legislative choice among a number of
possible rules." On the contrary, it chooses a rule which it
regards as having a "compulsory authority, not possessed by
its possible alternatives." It proceeds upon the theory that
the rule which it applies for the first time is already contained implicitly in the general principle of right and wrong.
This idea of law as an inductive science is well stated by
W. G. Hammond. His original work is not available to me,
but so important is the subject and so fine is Hammond's
elaboration of the idea that I venture to quote it at length
from the illuminating article by Professor Dickinson:
"The belief in a common law of which all precedents and decided
cases are merely the evidence and exposition cannot be a delusion or a
fiction so long maintained. Unless we are willing to surrender entirely
the belief that there is a divine order in the moral as well as the physical constitution of this world, we cannot assume that all the principles
upon which the cases of first impression have been decided for centuries were the creation of the judges Who wrote the particular opinions. Nor can we say that our English and American judges have made
the law which they expounded, unless we are willing to admit that the
whole course of their jurisprudence for at least six centuries has been
an unjust government of litigants by rules that did not exist when
7

2 MIcH. L. Rav. 159.

8 Bradford Corporation v. Farrand, 86 L. T. 497 (1902).
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they entered into the transactions adjudged. The new view that they
were really making law while they professed only to expound it, seems
to me to rest entirely upon the assumption that all law must necesrule or rules promulgated before hand in
sarily be legislation -a
writing by some earthly sovereign whom the people are bound to obey.
The old doctrine rested on the assumption that there were fixed principles of jural as well as moral right which every man was bound to
obey and which every magistrate was bound to recognize and enforce
to the best of his knowledge and ability." 9

It seems clear, therefore, that in cases where there is no
applicable statute, the court must and does recognize the
binding force of the natural law. This, I think, is the reason
for the peculiar tenacity of the common law. "There is something about it," says Roscoe Pound, "that commends it to
men of diverse lands and races; where it once goes, it
stays." 10

But suppose the case calls for the application of a statute.
Of course, if the validity of the statute is not in any way questioned, the court can only apply it as written. But where its
constitutionality is challenged, an issue is raised on which the
natural law may have a most important bearing. In this class
of cases, one of the principal avenues by which the natural
law finds its way into American jurisprudence is the doctrine
of vested rights.
This doctrine was first brought within the purview of constitutional law by Justice Patterson in 1795. Charging the
jury in a well-known case, he declared:
"The right of acquiring and possessing property and having it protected is one of the natural, inherent, and inalienable rights of man.
Men have a sense of property: It is necessary to their subsistence and
correspondent to their natural wants and desires." 11

It is quite obvious from this statement that the doctrine of
vested rights does not rest upon any positive enactment, but
upon the theory that every person has certain absolute and
inalienable rights and that the purpose of adopting the con9 Dickinson, The Law Behind the Law (1929) 29 CoL. L. REv. 113, 117.
10 Pound, Do We Need a Philosophy Law? (1905) 5 COL. L. Rpm. 339.
11 Van Home's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 Dafl. 304, 310 (1795).
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stitution was, not to create and confer them, but to protect
and preserve them. Under this theory these rights are inalienably vested in every person merely by virtue of his character of a human being under an eternal and universal law.
The due process clause, for instance, is simply one of the constitutional guaranties by which these vested rights are protected. When the validity of a statute is attacked as violating that clause, the court must determine whether the alleged
right is one of the vested rights, a question which it must
determine independently of any positive enactment. Certainly the constitution itself furnishes no criterion for the
determination of this question. Justice Chase's elaboration
of this doctrine 12 led to Chancellor Kent's classic statement
of it 13 three years later when he used the doctrine of vested
rights to prevent a New York statute from having a retrospective effect. Somewhat later 1 4 he used it again as a basis
for his decision that in exercising its right of eminent domain, the state owes compensation to the owner of property
-taken, even in the absence of any constitutional provision to
that effect.
Thus this doctrine of vested rights, in the hands of Chancellor Kent and his successors in New York, operated to
place important limitations on the state's power of eminent
domain and also on its police power. This "constrictive effect" of the doctrine, as Professor Corwin calls it,1 5 is contrasted with its "expansive effect" on the constitutional guaranty against impairing the obligation of a contract. Thus the
natural law, through the doctrine of vested rights, has found
a secure and enduring place in our legal system, as a rule of
constitutional construction.
As a matter of legal philosophy, however, the question as
to judicial recognition of the natural law would be presented
Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386 (1798).
Dash v. Van Kleek, 7 Johns. 478, 4 N. Y. Com. L. R. 391 (1811).
14
Gardner v. Newburg, 2 Johns. Ch. 162 (1819).
15 Corwin, Due Process of Law Before the Civil War (1911) 24 HARv. L.
REv. 366, 377.
12

13
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in its most acute form in the third case mentioned: Where
the statute is entirely consistent with the constitution, but in
conflict with the natural law. What would the court do in a
case like that? Would it endeavor to find some higher law,
some law reason or nature, independently of the constitution,
on which to base its decision?
It is remarkable that in this situation the judges of the Supreme Court have proceeded upon two distinct theories and
that at a very early date these theories were brought into
close juxtaposition in the same case. 6 Justice Chase thought
that the legislature was limited by the natural law, a view
which he expressed in the oft-quoted language:
"I cannot subscribe to the omnipotence of a state legislature or
that it is absolute and without control, although its authority should
not be restrained by the constitution or the fundamental -law of the
state. .

.

. There are certain vital principles in our free republican

governments which will determine and overrule an apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative power; as, to authorize manifest injustice by
positive law, or to take away that security for personal liberty and
private property, for the protection of which the government was established."

All this is in the same spirit in which Chancellor Coke
quoted Bracton's dictum to James I that the King ruled
sub Deo et lege.
Justice Iredell, on the other hand, declared in the same
case that if no limitation were imposed on the legislature by
the constitution, then whatever "it chose to enact would be
lawfully enacted and the judicial power would never interpose to pronounce it void. It is true that some speculative
jurists have held that a legislative act against natural justice
must in itself be void; but I cannot think that under such a
government, any court of Justice would possess power to
declare it so."
If we glance superficially at the cases decided since these
views were expressed in 1798, it would seem that Iredell's
16

Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386 (1798).
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view has prevailed; but if we look more closely we find that
the theory of Justice Chase has had by far the greater influence in directing the course of judicial decision. There are
numerous declarations such as that of Justice Chase, recognizing the superiority of the natural law. Our American positivists usually insist that such declarations are mere obiter
dicta; but the doictrine that there are extra-constitutional
limitations cannot be disposed of in this summary fashion.
The notion that there are fundamental and inalienable rights
which antedate government and furnish the main reason for
its existence permeates the whole field of constitutional law.
References to such inherent limitations are so interwoven
with the ratio deridendi in many cases that they must be
regarded as one -of the controlling grounds for the decision.
This is especially true of the cases decided before 1880. Thus,
Chief Justice Marshall, in Fletcher v. Peck,'7 explains the
reason for his decision as follows:
"It is then the unanimous opinion of the Court that in this case,
the estate having passed into the hands of a purchaser for a valuable
consideration without notice, the state of Georgia was restrained either

by the general principles which are common to our free institutions or
by the particular provisions of the constitution of the United States
from passing a law whereby the estate of the plaintiff in the premises
so purchased could be constitutionally and legally impaired and rendered null and void."

So, too, in a case' decided five years later, Justice Story,
in holding that a grant or title to land by the legislature is
irrevocable, based his decision on fundamental law and natural justice. After the natural law had gained a foothold in
American jurisprudence, a number of cases' 9 arose in which
it was even more clearly indicated'as the basis of the decision. The great defender of this doctrine was Justice Field,
whose statement in Butchers' Union, etc., Co. v. Crescent
6 Cranch 87 (1810).
Ferrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch 43 (1815).
Darcy v. Ketchum, 11 How. 165 (1850); Webster v. Reid, 11 How. 437
(1850); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1877); Hays v. Pacific Mail, 17 How.
596 (1854); St. Louis v. Ferry Co., 11 Wall. 423 (1870); Cole v. La Grange,
113 U. S. 1 (1884).
17
18
19
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City, etc., Co.2 0 has become the classic presentation of the
theory. In that case he declared:
"I can not believe that what is termed in the Declaration of Independence a God-given and inalienable right can be thus ruthlessly
taken from the citizen or that there can be any abridgment of the
right except by regulations affecting alike all persons of the same age,
sex and condition ....

The right to follow the common occupations of

life is an inalienable right which was formulated as such under the
phrase 'pursuit of happiness.'

. . . To deny it, is to invade one of the

fundamental privileges of the citizen contrary not only to the common right but also to the express provision of the constitution."

It is true there has always been a vigorous objection to the
natural law as a basis for judicial decision and since the Cole
case 1 the Supreme Court has never relied upon this doctrine
alone. But this eclipse is only apparent, not real. It is due,
not so much to the vigorous dissents, but more especially to
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, by which a fundamental principle of the natural law was made a part of
the constitution.
Since 1880 the courts have quite generally interpreted the
constitution as making the same requirements as the natural
law. This indicates that the hypothetical case now under discussion, where the statute conflicts with the natural law but
not with the constitution is one which must appear to present
day judges as purely imaginary. The Court has so infused
the natural law into its theories of constitutional construction
that whenever the Court finds a statute in conflict with the
natural law (or what it would call the "Higher Law" or the
"Law of Reason" or the "Unwritten Constitution") then it
always concludes, as Justice Field did, that the statute is in
conflict with the constitution.
This tendency to identify constitutional requirements with
those of the natural law is well exemplified in the history of
sterilization legislation. From a superficial reading of these
decisions, a person might conclude that the natural law is to20

21

S.746, 756 (1883).
Op'. cit. supra note 19.
111 U.
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tally ignored. And yet in every one of these cases, in determining, whether the statute conflicts with the Constitution,
the court is necessarily guided by some rule or proposition
not laid down in any positive enactment. As in the cases of
first impression under the common law, the court must evolve
some rule out of its own inner consciousness as to what is fair
and reasonable. In other words, it must endeavor to deduce
some rule from the principle of suum cuique. The Constitution, for instance, forbids cruel and unusual punishment; it
forbids class legislation; it forbids other things when done
without due process. These are the constitutional prohibitions that have been invoked against the sterilization statutes. Now, how can the court determine the meaning of
these provisions without considering the requirements of natural justice? If the punishment inflicted in any particular
case does not violate the requirement of natural justice, then
it is neither cruel nor unusual within the meaning of the Constitution. And the converse is equally true. The Court thus
makes -the natural law, or the rule deductible from the principle of suum cuique, the criterion of constitutionality. Obviously, any court proceeding on such a theory could not logically hold that a statute was in conflict with the natural law,
but consistent with the Constitution; it would hold either
that the statute was consistent with both or in conflict with
both. There is no case in which the language of the court can
be understood to say in effect: "This statute contradicts the
Higher Law; it contradicts the Law of Reason; but it is consistent with the Constitution." No court has ever entertained
such an opinion.
Of course, it should always be remembered that there may
be differences of opinion. When the court says that a certain
statute is or is not in conflict with the Constitution, other
men learned in the law may have a different opinion. So also
when the court says in effect that a certain statute is or is not
in conflict with the higher law, other competent persons may
have strong convictions to the contrary. In other words,

100
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while the court's opinion is authoritative, it may be logically
unsound. Here again the sterilization statute furnishes the
best example.
In conclusion, it may be said that the natural law finds a
place in American jurisprudence as a basis for judicial decision in cases of first impression under the common law and as
a guiding principle in the construction of constitutional limitations.
William P. Sternberg.
Creighton University, School of Law.

